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Reducing Extreme Suffering for
Non-Human Animals: Enhancement
vs. Smaller Future Populations?
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that ethical views that place primary importance
on the reduction of extreme suffering imply that, at least in theory,
it can be better to allow enhanced non-human animals to come into
existence rather than unenhanced non-human animals. Furthermore,
they imply that it would be even better if no non-human animals
came into existence at all. However, it is unclear, from the perspective
of these ethical views, whether enhancement or reduction of future
populations is the more effective strategy in practice, and whether
it might even be better to instead pursue a seemingly more robust
and less controversial third option of promoting greater concern for
the suffering of non-human animals in the first place. In this paper,
I seek to explore the different options from a practical perspective.
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In this paper I wish to examine what ethical views that place
primary importance on the reduction of extreme suffering imply for the moral status of animal enhancement. In particular,
I will argue that, according to such views, it can be better to
allow certain enhanced non-human animals to come into existence rather than unenhanced non-human animals, yet the best
would be if no non-human animals came into existence at all.
I then proceed to discuss the implications of this conclusion
for practical efforts to reduce extreme suffering for non-human
animals.

Preliminaries
I would like to first clarify the scope and terminology of
my argument. First of all, the argument I am making here pertains only to non-human animals. This is not to say that the
argument cannot be made with respect to humans as well, but
merely that this is not my concern in this essay. One reason for
this is that non-human animals generally possess a very limited
degree of moral agency. To a first approximation, most humans
can be considered moral agents, whereas non-human animals
cannot, at least not nearly to the same extent. And such moral
agency does complicate discussions about the potential effects
of enhancement and their ethical status, complications that can
be ignored if we restrict our argument to non-human animals
only. Note that I am not claiming that moral agents should
be granted greater moral consideration than non-agents. The
complications I seek to avoid by excluding moral agents mostly
have to do with the ability that such agents have to help others.
Second, I should like to clarify what I mean by “ethical
views that place primary importance on the reduction of extreme suffering”. By this I mean all ethical views according
to which an action’s propensity to reduce extreme suffering
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is the most important, yet not necessarily the only, criterion
by which we evaluate its value and ethical status. This evaluative criterion comprises a consequentialist element of a moral
theory. If this element stands alone, i.e. if an action’s propensity
to reduce extreme suffering is the only criterion by which we
evaluate its value and normativity, one gets a particular kind of
pure negative utilitarian view. Yet one can also include it as an
element in a larger set of values. The crucial point, however,
is that the ethical views whose implications I seek to examine
here are those according to which this element is granted an
overriding status. That is, views according to which the reduction of extreme suffering has overriding value, whether we also
consider other things valuable or not (I shall abbreviate this
class of ethical views by VPES, standing for “Values that grant
Primacy to the reduction of Extreme Suffering”). For example,
one can combine an overriding concern for the reduction of
extreme suffering with consequentialist views according to
which knowledge and happiness are also valuable. According
to such a pluralist view, an outcome with more knowledge and
more happiness would, other things being equal, be better than
an outcome with less of these. Yet outcomes with more extreme
suffering would always be worse than those with less, even if
the outcomes with less suffering contain more knowledge or
happiness. It is in this sense that the reduction of extreme suffering is granted an overriding status by VPES.
I shall not provide an elaborate defense of this view of the
moral status of extreme suffering here (for that, I recommend
consulting the sources cited below). A brief motivating thought
experiment in its favor is to imagine two different planets, one
of which can contain all the good things we can possibly imagine, while the other can contain only beings who experience
extreme suffering, e.g., beings who experience being eaten or
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skinned alive. The question, then, is whether we believe that
adding good things, including happy lives, to the first planet
can justify adding more extreme suffering to the other planet.
VPES can be justified with reference to the intuition that no
amount of good things added to the good planet can justify adding more extreme suffering to the bad one. Or, phrased more
generally, that no amount of good things added to the world
can justify adding more extreme suffering to it. This intuition
can in turn be justified with reference to other intuitions about
the moral importance of reducing extreme suffering versus
promoting good things, such as happiness. For example, some
(Popper 1945, chap. 9, note 2), have argued that there is a moral
urgency – “a direct moral appeal for help” – in reducing suffering while there is no similar urgency or moral importance in
increasing the happiness of the already happy. And even if one
thinks other things do carry some moral urgency, such as increasing happiness and increasing knowledge, it seems plausible that this urgency is not comparable to the moral urgency of
reducing extreme suffering. Karl Popper argued for this exact
claim with respect to happiness: “ . . . the promotion of happiness is in any case much less urgent than the rendering of help
to those who suffer . . . ” (Popper 1945, chap. 5, note 6). As for
the idea that happy experiences or other good things can compensate for extreme suffering, one can question in what sense
this could be the case. For example, some people claim to have
experienced suffering so extreme that, according to them, no
amount of good things could ever compensate for it (Vinding
2018a, chap. 7), which raises serious questions of how, and by
whose standards, positive experiences or other positive goods
are supposed to be able to compensate for these negative states.
This is not obvious. Indeed, it is a widely held intuition that the
most extreme states of suffering cannot be counterbalanced by
positive experiences (Gloor & Mannino 2016, section II).
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A fuller defense of the view that reducing extreme suffering
has moral primacy can be found in (Vinding 2018a, chap. 6-7);
(Vinding 2019, part I); (Leighton 2011, chap. 9); and (Gloor &
Mannino 2016). It is worth noting that this view bears similarity to ethical views found within the tradition of Buddhism
(Goodman 2009, 101), as well as to the view defended in Jamie
Mayerfeld’s Suffering and Moral Responsibility (Mayerfeld
1999, chap. 4-6). Indeed, a foremost moral priority to extreme
suffering can be grounded in many different premises, such as
by appeal to a prioritarian position or to the intrinsic badness of
extreme suffering itself, and these premises may be combined
or stand alone (Vinding, 2019, part I; Mayerfeld 1999, pp. 149152). Furthermore, to underscore the relevance of examining
the implications of VPES, it is worth noting that a recent survey in which 14,866 people were asked what goals they thought
should be strived for by a future civilization, the goal that was
favored more than any other, i.e. by a significant plurality, was
minimizing suffering (Future of Life Institute 2017).
Third, I should also clarify that my argument is restricted
to only concern beings who have not yet been brought into
existence. There are three reasons why I have chosen this restriction: (1) because it allows us to steer clear of many complications that arise concerning the ethics of altering or killing existing beings versus altering or preventing the existence
of future (merely) potential beings; (2) because future beings
who have not yet been born likely comprise the vast majority
of the beings we are able to impact with our actions (Beckstead 2013); and (3) because, even if we disregard the previous reason, our discussion concerning enhancement pertains
primarily to future beings, since the extent to which we can
change populations of currently living non-human animals,
via enhancement or otherwise, is likely limited compared to
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how much we will be able to change them in the future, when
humanity will presumably be significantly wealthier and more
technologically capable.
Lastly, I should clarify what I mean by “enhanced non-human animals” in this paper. By this I simply mean non-human
animals who have been altered by humans (e.g., via gene editing or selective breeding) primarily for the purpose of benefiting these beings themselves (and hence enhancement, as I
use the term, also encapsulates what is usually referred to as
disenhancement, such as the reduction or removal of the ability to experience suffering). This definition excludes beings
who have been altered purely for human benefit. It does not,
however, exclude beings who do not in fact gain a net benefit,
or who are even harmed, by the attempt to benefit them. In
other words, the loaded term “enhanced non-human animals”
neglects an important possibility which should not be overlooked, namely that human alterations of non-human animals,
even when they are well-intentioned, can go wrong.

An Enhanced Population Can Be Better; No
Population is Best
There are two claims I wish to argue for here. The first is
that, according to VPES, it can be better, at least in theory,
to allow enhanced non-human animals to come into existence
rather than unenhanced non-human animals. To realize this,
we can imagine a scenario where a fixed number of non-human animals will come into existence in the future (on all of
Earth, say). Provided that we can successfully alter this future
population in such a way that it will contain less extreme suffering than it otherwise would—for example, by significantly
down-regulating the pain-sensitivity of all individuals in the
population (Pearce 2015, 157; Pearce 2016)—then such an al-
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teration would, other things being equal, be normative according to VPES. Whether such enhancements are indeed feasible
for humanity to realize for a large population of non-human
individuals in practice, both technologically and sociologically,
is another issue, one we shall return to below.
The second claim I wish to establish here is that, even in
the best case, an enhanced future population of non-human
animals would still, according VPES, be strictly worse than
no population of non-human animals at all, other things being
equal. That is, between an idealized replacement option where
unenhanced non-human animals are replaced, within one generation, by enhanced non-human animals, and a cessation option where no new beings are brought into existence, the latter
is strictly better according to VPES.
This holds true since a population of zero non-human animals entails no extreme suffering, or indeed any suffering at
all, for such beings, whereas this would not be true, even in the
best possible case, of a future enhanced population. For even if
it is possible to eventually get to a point where we have altered
non-human animals so much that they can no longer experience extreme suffering, it is clearly not possible to get to that
point in a single generation. For example, in any population
of considerable size, accidents that cause severe bodily harm
are bound to happen (e.g., severe burns or crushing of a body
part), and it is not plausible that extreme suffering could be
made impossible in the face of such accidents in just a single
generation. Beyond that, there is also the problem of predation
(McMahan 2016) and the extreme suffering it entails, which
would also be impossible to phase out in just a single generation, or even a few.
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Furthermore, even if we were to reach a stage where we
have altered non-human animals so much that we are reasonably confident that they cannot experience extreme suffering,
there would still be a risk that they in fact can and will, a risk
which, even if quite small, would be much smaller still if there
were no non-human animals at all. Indeed, this risk seems
bound to remain significant, since non-human animals, unlike
humans, cannot communicate their subjective states as well
and in as much detail as humans can, both in terms of how they
are feeling, and what the source of a given feeling seems to be.
It seems doubtful, for example, that we would be able to assert
beyond a reasonable doubt that a group of small fish is unable
to experience extreme suffering merely by observing their behavior and knowing their full genetic profile. Thus, even in the
best possible case where we have gathered as much information
as we can, it seems that there would still be considerable uncertainty about the experiential states of enhanced non-human
animals, and hence considerable risk of the realization of states
of extreme suffering in these beings. (There would arguably be
significantly less uncertainty in the case of humans, and this
difference between human and non-human beings constitutes
a reason, though by no means a decisive one, to favor a population of enhanced humans rather than of enhanced non-humans
from the perspective of VPES; another such reason is the fact
that non-human individuals and their suffering are generally
granted far less moral concern by humanity than are human
individuals, implying that non-humans face a greater risk of
being harmed by humans). This risk should be minimized according to VPES, which is another reason why, even in the best
case, and even disregarding the point made above concerning
the impossibility of abolishing extreme suffering via enhancement in a few generations, a zero population would still, other
things being equal, be strictly better than a population of en-
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hanced non-human animals according to VPES. (It is worth
noting that views other than VPES can favor a similar conclusion; for instance, (Ng 1995) and (Horta 2015) argue that
suffering and disvalue prevail in the lives of most non-human
animals, which, if true, would imply that a zero population
would be better than the current one according to many different value systems, while (Vinding 2016) argues that merely
applying a non-speciesist position on procreative ethics implies
that it would be better if the vast majority of non-human animals were never born.)
In sum, a future population of enhanced non-human animals would, even in the best case, entail significant amounts,
as well as risks, of extreme suffering, which, other things being equal, renders such a population worse than no population
according to VPES. And since this conclusion also applies to
any given sub-population within a larger population, it follows
that a smaller population, of both enhanced and unenhanced
non-human animals, is, other things being equal, better than a
larger one.

Practical Implications: Two Controversial
Options
These conclusions are all rather theoretical, however, as they
do not factor in any considerations about the practical feasibility of these two options of (1) enhancing future populations
of non-human animals and (2) reducing or phasing them out
altogether. For even if one accepts the evaluative conclusion we
have drawn above at the theoretical level, one may still maintain that the best thing we can do to reduce extreme suffering,
in practice, is to focus on enhancement rather than on phasing
out or reducing populations of non-human animals.
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This view is held by negative utilitarian David Pearce, who
focuses primarily on the enhancement of future populations
of non-human animals so as to gradually reduce, and eventually abolish, their suffering throughout the living world (Pearce
2007; 2015; 2016). He considers this the most promising and
feasible way to reduce the suffering, including extreme suffering in particular, of non-human animals, all things considered.
This is in part because he considers the option of enhancement,
particularly via so-called CRISPR-based gene drives, a uniquely cheap way to reduce the suffering of non-human animals
(Pearce 2016), but also in large part because he believes most
people are more receptive to the idea of enhancing non-human
animals than they are to the idea of phasing them out or significantly reducing their numbers (personal communication).
In contrast, Brian Tomasik, another negative utilitarian who
has also written extensively about how to best reduce the suffering of non-human animals, believes the most promising
approach to focus on is instead to reduce populations of nonhuman animals (Tomasik 2015c, 144; 2016a; 2016b). In particular, Tomasik views the reduction of natural habitats as a
promising way to achieve such population reductions, which
he considers more realistic than Pearce’s strategy of encouraging humanity to altruistically pursue enhancements of nonhuman animals that have no benefit for humanity itself (Tomasik 2016a, 2016b). Indeed, Tomasik notes that he believes,
with “99+% probability”, that widespread altruistic efforts of
the sort Pearce proposes to help wild animals will never come
to fruition (Tomasik 2016b).
In the context of this paper, it is worth examining these respective proposals made by Pearce and Tomasik, including the
reasoning behind them, in depth. For they are, to my knowl-
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edge, the only concrete intervention proposals that have been
defended with respect to the particular goal of minimizing the
extreme suffering of future non-human animals. The underlying question here—which practical actions can be expected to
best reduce extreme suffering?—is, it should be noted, an empirical question, one that depends on various factors which can
be broken down and examined individually.
For one, there is the question of receptivity. Which idea
would people be most willing to accept? As noted above,
Pearce’s position is in part animated by the belief that people
will generally be more open to the idea of enhancement than
they are to pure population reduction. Tomasik’s position, on
the other hand, rests more on the belief that most people would
be too selfish and anthropocentric to support such altruistic efforts. And there are indeed reasons to be skeptical of the idea
that enhancement would be more welcome than reductions of
future populations. One such reason is that enhancement efforts
of this kind seem bound to entail a significant amount of experimentation on non-human animals, which may be opposed
by many. For although some studies indicate that a majority of
people support such experimentation “so long as it is for [human] medical research purposes and there is no alternative”
(Clemence & Leaman 2016, 4; Souza et al. 2017, 112), it should
be noted that (1) the opposition against such experimentation
is still significant, and (2) it is unclear whether there would be
similar support for experimentation aimed toward reducing the
suffering of non-human animals.
Beyond that, there is the fact many people still reject genetically modified (GMO) foods, despite many scientific studies
concluding that they are as safe to consume as non-GMO foods
(National Academies of Sciences 2016), which also constitutes
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at least a weak reason to expect resistance to the idea of modifying non-human animals for their own sake. As for whether
many people will ever be willing to benefit non-human individuals in the first place, there arguably is some evidence that
people are in fact already supportive, at least in a generic sense.
For example, a 1999 poll conducted in the United States found
that 76 percent of people agreed that a “[non-human] animal’s
right to live free of suffering is just as important as a [human]
person’s right to live free of suffering” (Appleby 2008, 249).
Tomasik’s proposal, however, is in large part animated by
the view that efforts to reduce or enhance future populations of
non-human animals for altruistic reasons is unrealistic. Therefore, rather than trying to appeal to human altruism, Tomasik’s
view is that the best thing to do is to push for interventions that
reduce non-human populations, and that humans already want
anyway for self-interested reasons, such as replacing grass
lawns by gravel lawns or solar panels (Tomasik 2015a). As Tomasik writes:
Reducing wild-animal populations can be done by
working with the grain of human selfishness rather
than against it. For this reason, reducing populations
seems plausibly more impactful as a way to prevent
animal suffering in the short run than developing expensive, high-tech solutions that won’t arrive for many
years and that humans have no selfish reason to deploy
(Tomasik, 2016c).
Yet elsewhere, Tomasik argues that it nonetheless could
make sense to devote some resources to enhancement approaches:
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It would be a shame if people rested all their hopes
on gene drives and didn’t pursue other approaches
to help wild animals in the short run. But exploring
gene drives as one “high-risk stock” within a diversified portfolio of compassionate-biology research topics
seems reasonable (Tomasik 2016b).
Thus, it need not be either-or, as one can clearly support efforts to both reduce and enhance future populations of nonhuman animals simultaneously, which Pearce does too, as he
advocates for cross-species fertility regulation to prevent nonhuman animal populations from increasing (Pearce 2016). And
so rather than being a matter of the one approach versus the
other, the question is arguably just what level and form the emphasis on these two respective strategies should ideally take—
a question that in turn depends on some of the open questions
that have been raised above, namely: how receptive will humanity be to these respective ideas? And how altruistic can we
expect humans to be toward non-human animals in the future?
These are empirical questions that can, and probably should
(from the perspective of VPES), be examined closer.
These questions about human attitudes are not the only relevant questions, however. Another important question is how
technologically and economically feasible these proposed
solutions are. Covering land with gravel or solar panels, for
instance, is expensive, and covering all of Earth in this way
will not be technologically nor economically feasible for the
foreseeable future, if indeed ever. And the point Pearce would
make is that the same is not true for the enhancement strategies
he is proposing:
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Back-of-an-envelope calculation suggests the financial
cost of a happy non-human biosphere [by means of enhancement, e.g., via CRISPR gene drives] would currently be several hundred million dollars – plus annual
maintenance costs of perhaps several million dollars
per year (Pearce 2016).
In other words: all sentient beings on Earth could, according to Pearce, have their suffering alleviated and eventually
abolished relatively cheaply. This is a staggering and highly
disputable claim, of course. Yet it does nonetheless seem plausible that this enhancement solution could potentially, provided
that it is indeed technically feasible, be much cheaper than the
strategy of covering land, at least for very large areas of land.
And if Pearce is right about the technological feasibility and
low price of such an endeavor, this also has implications for
the level of altruism required to make such a project happen. It
could turn out to be very little.
Whether Pearce’s estimates of both the technological and
economic feasibility of such an effort of global enhancement
of non-human animals are realistic is yet another empirical
question that can be examined further. And along with the empirical questions listed above concerning human attitudes, this
question is critical to explore in order to settle which of the two
options discussed here – basically, enhancement via technology versus population reduction by means of habitat reduction
– is best to spend one’s marginal resources on in order to reduce extreme suffering.

A Third Option?
Might there, however, be a third option that is even better
than the two options examined above? At a first glance, if one
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only looks at the level of direct interventions, there do indeed
seem to be only two main options for reducing the suffering of
future non-human animals – namely, to either reduce or change
their populations significantly. Yet this does not imply that a direct focus on either of these two options is optimal in practice,
when we factor in more indirect actions we can take.
At the level of advocacy, there seems to be a real risk that
advocating for enhancement and/or reduction of future populations of non-human animals could backfire and end up being counterproductive due to the controversial nature of these
proposals. Indeed, it seems likely that many people who would
otherwise support the underlying value that animates these
proposals—i.e. the reduction of extreme suffering experienced
by non-human animals—will nonetheless reject these controversial proposals for intervention, a rejection that seems even
more likely if this underlying value has not been explained and
argued for carefully in the first place.
This, then, tentatively suggests another approach to prioritize: to promote concern for the suffering, especially the extreme suffering, experienced by non-human animals, and to
argue for the moral primacy of its reduction. Beyond the fact
that people will likely be more receptive to such a message, a
lack of concern for non-human suffering may also constitute
the main bottleneck with respect to the realization of concrete
interventions that prevent extreme suffering, such as those discussed above. Pearce, for instance, seems to view humanity’s
level of concern for the suffering of non-human animals, not
technological or economic limitations, as the main bottleneck
by far that prevents the realization of the enhancement scenario
he argues for (Pearce 2007; 2016). Tomasik, too, seems to view
such a focus on values as being uniquely promising, among
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other reasons because: (1) it is more robust in the face of new
information—promoting a set of values seems more likely to
be positive for the realization of these values than promoting
particular interventions that may turn out to be negative in light
of new information; (2) one can build a movement around these
values, which both seems more feasible than does building a
movement centered around, say, habitat reduction, as well as
more likely to be positive and flexible with respect to optimizing that set of values than a more specific focus on a particular
intervention (e.g., one can thereby get more people to join the
endeavor of figuring out which concrete interventions best help
alleviate the suffering of non-human animals, and how to best
reduce extreme suffering in general); and finally, (3) a focus
on promoting VPES seems less replaceable than most other efforts one could pursue to reduce extreme suffering:
Most object-level projects that one might undertake are
already being done by lots of people with various ideological positions. In contrast, there are very few people
promoting suffering-focused ethical viewpoints. So
efforts to promote suffering-focused ethics may have
more counterfactual impact than promoting a more
mainstream cause that’s less specific to your values
(Tomasik 2015b).
And one may argue that habitat reduction, although it is all
but never considered an altruistic cause, indeed is an endeavor
that is carried out by many more people than is advocacy for
the moral significance of the extreme suffering of non-human
animals, and hence that one may expect, by the argument in
Tomasik’s quote above, that using one’s marginal resources to
promote habitat reduction would be less effective than the promotion of concern for such suffering. Also because, even if
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one believes that the best one can do, in terms of direct interventions, is to push for slightly more habitat reduction on the
margin, it could be that focusing primarily on the promotion of
concern for the suffering of non-human animals is the best way
to gain support for such efforts in the first place.
The fact that it is such a clear point of agreement that the
promotion of concern for the extreme suffering of non-human
animals is beneficial with respect to VPES, and that it indeed
may be what best addresses the most crucial bottleneck with
respect to the alleviation of such extreme suffering, also comprises a reason to focus one’s practical efforts most strongly on
the promotion of such concern. In contrast, the utility of any
given direct intervention (e.g. habitat reduction or enhancement via genetic engineering) is much less agreed upon, and
also in part for that reason more controversial, which constitutes a reason to be more careful and hesitant about focusing
mostly on such interventions (both due to considerations concerning cooperation between disagreeing agents, as well as
considerations about epistemic humility in light of empirical
disagreements, in this case about what best reduces extreme
suffering in practice).
It should be noted in this context, however, that, from the perspective of VPES, it is not enough to merely promote increased
moral consideration for non-human animals per se, since such
increased consideration for these individuals, if not coupled
with a strong concern for their suffering, may in fact lead to an
increase rather than a reduction of suffering for these individuals. This is because other value systems may favor increasing
the numbers of those beings who fall within the notional circle
of moral consideration, even if such an increase happens at the
cost of an increase in extreme suffering. In this way, generic
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moral circle expansion can actually end up being a very bad
thing from the perspective of VPES, and hence should likely,
from this perspective, be supplemented strongly by arguments
for the moral primacy of reducing extreme suffering (Vinding
2018a, chap. 9; Vinding 2018b; Tomasik 2015b).
Conversely, it is also true that merely promoting concern
for extreme suffering is not sufficient either, as there is a risk
that such increased concern will fail to pertain properly to the
suffering of non-human animals, as opposed to relating almost purely to human suffering. Thus, from the perspective of
VPES, both widening the moral circle and deepening concern
for extreme suffering are necessary yet insufficient on their
own (Vinding 2018a, chap. 9). How to best effect such changes
in society in more concrete terms stands as an open question,
yet producing and publicizing written pieces, lectures, and
documentaries that argue for such a broader and deeper concern for extreme suffering seem promising options.

Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that, even in the best case, a future population of enhanced non-human animals would entail
significant amounts, as well as risks, of extreme suffering. This
renders such a population worse than no population according
to VPES, and a smaller population better than a larger one,
other things being equal.
These theoretical conclusions concerning the implications
of VPES are important and worth being clear about, not least
because they imply that it would be better, according to VPES,
to avoid increasing future populations (for instance, by spreading non-human animal life into space), even if we believed the
risk that these populations will entail extreme suffering to be
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very low. Nonetheless, these theoretical conclusions still do not
clearly show which actions that are optimal to take in practice
in order to best reduce the extreme suffering of future nonhuman animals, which stands as an open empirical question.
The utility of focusing on concrete interventions directed at enhancing and/or reducing future non-human animal populations
is unclear and dependent on various factors, some of which can
be investigated empirically, such as people’s attitudes toward
such proposals, the level of altruism we can expect humans to
exercise toward non-human animals, and the technological and
economic feasibility of the concrete interventions in question.
Such investigations may help inform which specific interventions are most worth focusing on, if any.
Finally, I presented some reasons why the best way to reduce
extreme suffering for future non-human animals, in practice,
may be to focus mostly on the strategy of promoting concern
for such suffering in the first place, such as by arguing that its
reduction has moral primacy. This seems a more robust strategy
that one can more easily build a movement around compared to
if one were to focus more purely on direct and controversial interventions, such as gene editing or habitat reduction. Beyond
that, such increased concern may also be what best addresses
the main bottleneck that prevents us from knowing and doing
more at the level of direct interventions, and hence this indirect
strategy could well be the best way to foster progress at this
more direct level as well. In other words, rather than focusing
mostly on enhancing or otherwise altering non-human animal
populations, the best way to reduce the extreme suffering of
non-human animals in the future may, at this point at least, be
to focus most of our resources on enhancing humanity’s concern for such suffering first and foremost, and to argue for the
moral primacy of its reduction.
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